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Abstract 
On November 8, 2016, the Indian government abruptly demonetized 86% of its 
currency in circulation in an attempt to reduce black money, corruption, and coun-
terfeiting. Yet, 99% of the currency was eventually returned to banks. We exploit 
large regional variations in deposit growth as a result of demonetization to study the 
medium term effects of this policy. Using night-light data, we show that districts which 
experienced higher deposit growth during the demonetization period, recorded higher 
levels of economic activity in the year and a half that followed. We estimate a one stan-
dard deviation increase in deposits is associated with a 5% increase in district GDP per 
capita. Further, districts with larger rural population, agricultural and non-agricultural 
informal labor shares also recorded an increase in nighttime light activity. The results 
are also supported by household level surveys on income and expenditures. 
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1 Introduction 
On November 8, 2016, the Indian government announced large currency denomination 
notes would no longer be considered legal tender and, with few exceptions, had to be 
deposited into banks by the end of the calendar year. These notes (in 500 and 1000 INR 
denominations) accounted for 86% of currency in circulation. For a country like India, where 
almost ninety percent of transactions take place in cash, such an abrupt announcement 
threw the economy into chaos. The avowed goals of the policy were reducing the volume 
of the “black economy”, increasing the tax base, and reducing funding sources for terrorist 
activities. There is considerable, if not outright skepticism, whether the policy achieved 
any of these. It is generally accepted that it reduced economic growth in the last quarter of 
2016 and also to some extent in the first quarter of 2017. In this research, we investigate the 
regional and household level effects over approximately a year and a half (till May 2018) 
since demonetization. We document that districts that recorded higher deposit growth 
during the last quarter of 2016 also experienced faster growth in night time lights over 
the next one and a half years. We also show that this is true for districts that have 
larger rural population shares, larger agricultural labor force shares, and a larger fraction 
of non-agricultural labor force employed in small firms (less than ten employees). Using a 
household panel survey, we also document that rural and agricultural households residing 
in districts with higher deposit growth also experienced a relative increase in real incomes 
and expenditures. 
There are three sources of motivation for this research. First, as shown in Figure 
1, the monthly night light data exhibit a clear upward trajectory during most of 2017 
despite having been relatively stagnant between 2014 and 2016. This might be purely 
coincidental, but is hard to ignore given the context. Second, contrary to expectations, 
99% of the demonetized currency notes were returned. This was despite the fact that, in an 
effort to punish those with unaccounted cash, the Indian government introduced additional 
rules regarding the amount of discontinued currency that could be deposited into a bank 
account.1 Those who had black money clearly figured out ways to “launder” their cash.2 
These methods, which emerged quickly and were widespread, included channeling cash 
through accounts of employees, brokers who found low income households or zero balance 
1Broadly, the maximum amount a single individual could deposit without the potential danger of further 
scrutiny was 250000 Indian Rupees, equivalent to 3740 US dollars on November 8th. 
2In this paper, we use adjectives such as “black”, “shadow”, and “unaccounted” interchangeably. Medina 
and Schneider (2018), noting the interchangeability of these terms, define the shadow economy to “include 
all economic activities which are hidden from official authorities for monetary, regulatory, and institutional 
reasons”. It generally does not include purely criminal and illegal activities, though that might be hard to 
distinguish in practice, especially the extensive use of bribes which facilitate the avoidance of regulatory 
burdens. 
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account holders, advance salary payments to employees, settlement of debts, or even finding 
businesses (usually informal) who were willing to sell goods at a markup if purchased 
with the defunct notes. Invariably, all of these methods involved paying a premium or a 
commission to the intermediaries and the ultimate depositor.3 In effect, what transpired 
was a one time widespread reallocation or redistribution of wealth, but not the kind the 
government had in mind.4 An obvious question that follows is whether redistribution 
through such channels could be sizable enough to actually have any expansionary effect. An 
accurate calculation would require knowledge regarding the amount of unaccounted cash in 
the country preceding demonetization - still very much an unknown; however, we can make 
a calculated guess. In an update to their earlier widely cited studies, Medina and Schneider 
(2018) estimate India’s shadow economy to be on average almost 25% of GDP for the period 
2004-2015. Assuming that the cash-GDP ratio in the shadow economy is the same as that 
of the regular economy–i.e., 12%–unaccounted cash would amount to approximately 3% 
of GDP.5 If approximately 30% was redistributed during the money laundering process, 
this amounts to 1% of GDP. As a point of reference, refundable tax credits and assistance 
to households in 2010 as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) 
stood at 0.36% of GDP. Thus even if only 10% was redistributed, the relative value would 
be similar to ARRA rebates.6 Third, we are also interested in investigating whether the 
some of the sudden influx of deposits during this time was accompanied by subsequent 
increases in lending by the banking system, and thus possibly creating an expansionary 
effect in the medium term despite the decline in output in the short term. While all of 
these three factors suggest there might be an aggregate expansionary effect, in our research 
we focus on the regional effects where variations in the shocks are both more apparent, and 
the sample size lends itself to easier empirical analysis and causal inference. 
To examine the effects of demonetization, we use a difference-in-difference strategy. 
3See Huffington Post (2016) and KPMG (2016) for a description of these methods. During that time 
the government also introduced certain schemes for declaring black money, but this money was subject to 
tax rates of 45-50%, which would likely be the de facto maximum “fee” for any money laundering method. 
First hand anecdotes indicate that the going rate could be as high as 40% of the amount being deposited. 
In situations where someone received a fee for depositing the money, the remaining amount was usually 
returned during that quarter or the next depending on currency availability. 
4The government counted on a substantial fraction of notes never being returned leading to a reduction 
in liabilities of the Reserve Bank. Bhagwati et al (2017) and Koning (2017) are early essays speculating on 
unintended redistribution. 
5These numbers are conservative. According to a government sponsored but unreleased report in 2013 
titled “Study on Unaccounted Incomes in India”, the National Institute of Public Finance and Policy 
estimates that the shadow economy was about 45% of GDP (Table 4.16 ) for 2000-2010. The money to 
GDP ratio in the shadow economy is also certainly higher than 12% since the formal banking sector is 
avoided for these transactions. 
6Bhagwati et al (2017) also view 30% as the eventual equilibrium laundering fee. The numbers for ARRA 
reflect the sum of outlays for Title 1 (Tax Provisions) and Title 2(Assistance for Unemployed Workers and 
Struggling Families) in CBO (2009). 
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Though the implementation of demonetization was exogenous, it also occurred simultane-
ously across the country, allowing no time variation. Thus, we have to rely on a source 
of cross-sectional variation. To capture heterogeneous treatment at the district level, we 
calculate the growth (i.e., the percent change) in total outstanding bank deposits between 
the end of the third quarter of 2016 (i.e the quarter before demonetization was imple-
mented) and the end of the fourth quarter of 2016 (the deadline for depositing discontinued 
notes). Since both the reallocation channel and the credit channel requires us to “follow 
the money”, this growth in deposits is well suited for our exercise. In particular, it picks 
up a useful geographic element: if notes were being laundered through rural branches or 
via migrant workers making remittances to their home villages, this would be recorded as 
deposit growth in those areas, and not at the source location of the cash. 
Using monthly nighttime lights as our outcome variable, we show that districts that 
experienced a higher growth in deposits from demonetization had a) lower values of log 
night time lights during the two months when currency restrictions were in place, and b) 
recorded higher values of log nighttime lights in the post demonetization period (ie from 
January 2017 to May 2018). We subject our estimation to a range of robustness checks 
including checking for parallel trends, time trends, month effects, placebo tests, geography 
based post trends, etc. 
Much of the debate about asymmetric effects of demonetization has centered around how 
the rural and informal economy bore the brunt of the chaos that followed. Therefore, in lieu 
of deposit growth during the demonetization quarter, which can be viewed as a proximate 
measure of treatment intensity, we also use other, more ultimate district characteristics 
from the pre-demonetization period to capture treatment intensity. These include (a) rural 
population shares of each district, (b) agricultural labor share in each district, and (c) Share 
of non-agricultural laborers employed in small firms (less than ten employees). For all of 
these too, we find negative effects during the demonetization months followed by positive 
and significant effects on nighttime lights for the subsequent months. 
We supplement our regional analysis, by exploring a household panel on income and 
expenditures. The Consumer Pyramids survey, which we describe in detail later follows 
approximately 160,000 households and records income and expenditure details as well as 
other household characteristics. Despite sampling challenges such as over-representation 
of urban households and lack of coverage of all districts, we document that rural and 
agricultural households in districts that had higher deposit growth also recorded higher 
values of real income and expenditures following demonetization. 
In the last part of the paper, we explore a couple of possible mechanisms. First, using 
the household survey, we show that there is some evidence private transfers were greater 
during the post demonetization period and this disproportionately benefited agricultural 
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and rural household living in districts more exposed to demonetization (measured by deposit 
growth from demonetization). The event study analysis indicates that the effects manifest 
themselves well into 2017 and not earlier as one would expect. It’s not surprising that 
it is difficult to get clear evidence. It is unlikely that recipients of one time payments 
would be forthcoming in surveys. Second, we examine the credit channel. The estimates 
indicate that districts with higher deposit growth also saw statistically significant increases 
in credit. Nevertheless this finding is tempered by the event study which shows rural areas 
were seeing an increase in credit flow before demonetization. The result is not surprising 
given that lending by banks in India is already subject to many government schemes and 
policy priorities. Overall, our mechanisms section indicate that a lot more research needs 
to be done to square the sustained increases in economic activity after the initial shock. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next subsection, we discuss demon-
etization in a little bit more detail and the related literature. In Section 2, we discuss the 
various data sources and provide an overview some of the important patterns. We cover 
the empirical specifications and also present our results for both regional and household 
analysis in Section 3, while 4 covers the mechanisms. Section 5 concludes. 
1.1 Background and Related Literature 
India’s demonetization has been widely covered and discussed in the media and academic 
blogs. A reading of the Indian prime minister, Narendra Modi’s, speech from November 
8th, 2016, clearly indicates two rationales, corruption and terrorism, both fueled by black 
money.7 The use of counterfeit notes is also mentioned in the initial announcement. Other 
rationales such as increasing the tax base and steering individuals towards traceable meth-
ods of transacting are not mentioned in the speech, and were enunciated later. While it 
is widely acknowledged that black money is a real problem in India, it is also true that 
most residents rely on cash for their daily transactions. For example Mazzotta et al (2014) 
note that almost 87% of transactions in India used cash in 2012, and Indians with access 
to formal banking also tend to transact in cash and carry high denomination notes.8 The 
unusual hardship that this caused the general population combined with skepticism about 
its success led to widespread criticism. This was validated later when in 2017, the Reserve 
Bank released statistics indicating that 99% of the high denomination notes made its way 
7See Modi (2016). 
8While India’s currency to GDP ratio of approximately 12% was higher than average for a sample of 
countries in 2014, it was not that much higher than that of the Euro Area (10.33%). As a share of M1, at 
65% it was the highest in the sample of countries recorded by the Bank of International Settlements (2015). 
However this too might be misleading since most households and businesses in India use savings accounts 
making M3 the more appropriate yardstick. 
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back to the banking system.9 In terms of the macroeconomic effects of demonetization, 
the Government of India speculated that it would reduce real GDP growth by about a 
half a percentage point.10 Figure 2a displays the seasonally adjusted annualized growth in 
quarterly real GDP. One can observe a spike in growth during 2016 before demonetization, 
and if anything, slightly above trend growth during the demonetization quarter and the one 
following it. Any unusual decline in growth rates seemed to have occurred only later during 
the second and third quarter of 2017. In Figure 2b, we track some nominal macroeconomic 
variables - the Consumer Price Index, currency in circulation, total deposits and M3. The 
variables are normalized to 1 for the third quarter preceding the policy. As is clear, cur-
rency in circulation declined dramatically while prices and M3 stagnate temporarily before 
continuing to increase suggesting that the effects were largely temporary. M3 stagnates 
because the currency in circulation is offset by the increase in deposits. 
Related Literature. Given the nature of the policy, most of the literature on demon-
etization so far has exploited household, regional, or sectoral variations. Aggarwal and 
Narayan (2017), probably the earliest empirical paper, employ difference in difference spec-
ifications to examine the effect on trade in 35 agricultural commodities across 3000 loca-
tions. They find that after 90 days the value of trade was still lower by 7% with most of 
the decline being due to prices. Beyer et al (2018), Bhavnani and Copelovitch (2018) and 
Chodorow-Reich et al (2018) are the closest to our research - all of which exploit district 
level data. Beyer et al (2018) apply different measures of district level informality - urban-
ization, banking access and wage earners - and show that night lights growth was lower in 
informal districts during the demonetization quarter.11 Chodorow-Reich et al (2018) are 
to our knowledge the only paper to develop a macro model to calibrate the aggregate ef-
fects. They too rely on district level estimates of night lights data and use elasticities from 
Henderson et al (2012) to impute aggregate output reductions. To arrive at a measure 
of district level exposure to demonetization, they use confidential Reserve Bank of India 
data on currency note transactions. They calculate a rate of replacement of new currency 
during November and December 2016 relative to old currency as a measure of district level 
demonetization shock (higher values mean less adverse effects), which they argue is random 
9As far as the tax base is concerned, taxes grew faster than GDP by 8.07 percentage points in the fiscal 
year of April 2017-March 2018. For comparison, the average growth difference during 2000-01 to 2009-10 was 
8.32 percentage points. With regards to counterfeit notes, while there was indeed a jump in the growth of 
number of notes detected from 6% to 20%, the fraction that were considered counterfeit was only 0.000008% 
preceding demonetization. 
10Ministry of Finance, Govt. of India, (2017), p73. Complicating matters further, the government revised 
its methodology to calculate GDP growth. Subramanian (2019) argues that these revised measures seem 
more like outliers compared to other independent macroeconomic indicators. 
11Their findings are part of a larger research project on the applicability of using night lights to measure 
short run variations. They also look at the 2015 earthquake in Nepal and conflict in Afghanistan. 
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across districts. They show that demonetization had negative effects during the quarter 
of demonetization on light growth, credit growth, and employment. They also show other 
indicators such as electronic payments and our measure of treatment intensity - growth 
in deposits - increased during the demonetization period, but these effects are temporary, 
disappearing (or becoming insigificantly different than zero) by the first half of 2017. Bhav-
nani and Copelovitch (2018) use the number of bank branches as a measure of exposure 
to demonetization at the district level and show that while economic activity, as captured 
by new investment projects, was lower during that quarter, political support for Narendra 
Modi’s Bhartiya Janta Party actually increased in the first half of 2017. They attribute 
this to the overall framing of demonetization as an all out attack on corruption.12 While 
these papers generally focus on the contractionary aspects, Agarwal et al (2018) examine 
granular data on digital payments from various sources. They show that there was a sig-
nificant rise in the use of digital technologies going into the first half of 2017. However, the 
effects are stronger for regions that already had pre-existing digital infrastructure in place. 
In comparison, our research contributes to the understanding of how regions and house-
holds were affected well after the note withdrawal phase was over in light of a possibly 
substantial reallocation of liquidity involving multiple mechanisms. In this respect our re-
search is also closely related to the large literature on the regional and household effects of 
aggregate shocks. These include research on the housing crisis and its effects on regional 
growth in the US (Mian and Sufi, 2014), the shale boom on local wages and employment 
(Feyrer, et al, 2017), and a large emerging research on fiscal policy shocks and regional 
multipliers (see Chodorow-Reich, 2019 and Nakamura and Steinsson, 2018). A key differ-
ence between much of this research and our work is that we document two distinct phases: 
(1) the chaotic contractionary phase during the last two months of 2016 followed by (2) 
an expansionary period over the next 15 months. As far as we know, we are the first to 
document this expansionary effect from India’s demonetization. 
Our research is also tied to the literature on unanticipated shocks and their effects on 
consumption. For example, Aldangady (2015) exploits regional shocks in home prices in 
the US to study individual consumption patterns, and Agarwal and Qian (2014), Angrisani 
et al (2019), and Japelli and Padula (2015) study consumption responses to unanticipated 
wealth shocks. In the case of demonetization, at the individual level, there are several 
confounding factors. Given that there is a general consensus that there was a short term 
decline in income and employment, it would have led to a negative transitory shock, which 
would affect groups that are liquidity constrained–i.e., poorer households. On the other 
hand, any redistribution of wealth would be a positive transitory shock to low income 
households, which would manifest itself in the medium term. Finally, such redistribution 
12Their analysis is limited to 75 districts. 
7 
would mean negative transitory shocks to the wealthy (who are not liquidity constrained 
and their consumption would be unaffected). 
Japelli and Pistaferri (2010) provide a useful diagnostic discussion about the links be-
tween various types of shocks and their asymmetric effects on consumption. As they note, 
in the presence of borrowing constraints the marginal propensity to consume can be high 
and thus could lead to a significant reduction in consumption with negative transitory 
shocks. On the other hand, a positive shock can lead to higher savings (which can include 
purchases of non-durables and physical assets).13 Unfortunately, we do not have direct 
data on who received payments and which individuals suffered wealth shocks. Since we 
rely on district level deposit growth and other broad classifications such as rural/urban and 
agriculture/non-agriculture, we cannot disentangle the individual effects on incomes and 
expenditures from local general equilibrium effects. Indeed our estimation with household 
data should really be viewed more as corroborating the regional analysis. 
2 Data 
In this section we provide a brief overview of the various measures and their sources both at 
the regional and household level. Mainly, we focus on the night time light data, our measure 
of deposit growth, the census variables capturing rural population and agricultural labor 
force, and finally the household data from the consumer pyramid survey. Appendix Table 
A1 provides summary statistics of the key variables. 
Night Lights Since 2012, the Earth Observation Group (EOG) at the NOAA National 
Center for Environment Science has been processing and sharing global low light imaging 
data from the Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite (VIIRS) Day/Night Band (DNB) 
on a monthly basis. This supersedes the earlier annual night light data that has been 
widely used by economists beginning with Chen and Nordhaus (2011) and Henderson et al 
(2012). One of the key advancements of the newer data, apart from the monthly frequency, 
is four times greater resolution (at the equator each pixel is now 0.214 sq km). Other 
major advancements include no saturation, lower detection limits, wider dynamic range, 
and 45 times smaller pixel footprints.14 The version we use is the monthly average filtered 
by EOG to exclude data impacted by stray light, lightning, lunar illumination, and cloud-
cover. Figure 1 portrays the path of log lights for India as whole after controlling for cloud 
13The absence of access to formal credit does not mean that individuals do not have access to other more 
costly means of acquiring credit. 
14For a more technical discussion see Elvidge et al (2017). We should note that while earlier the data was 
captured at around 10:30 in the night, the newer data is captured at 1AM which could potentially weaken 
the correlation with economic activity 
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free days and month effects. A problem that arises with monthly data, and particularly 
for a country like India, is that extensive cloud coverage might lead to very few or even 
zero daily observations for a pixel during the monsoon months. The monthly average has 
a non-missing value only if there was at least one day with no cloud coverage. The light 
extraction algorithm after removing clouds has only 84% accuracy.15 To deal with these 
issues, we control for cloud free days in our econometric work. Further, it serves as a proxy 
for precipitation, an important source of variation in economic activity. Despite controlling 
for month effects and cloud free days, one can see there is still considerable month to 
month variation in the data. When conducting robustness tests, we repeat our estimation 
but restrict the pixels to only those that were lit in the annual composite data created by 
EOG for 2015, i.e. by looking at an intensive margin rather than an extensive margin.16 
We aggregate (the unweighted sum) the pixel level data to the district level. The unusual 
spike in lights in 2017 clearly stands out in Figure 1, particularly compared to the relative 
stagnation preceding it. 
District Level Deposit Data Our primary measure of capturing the exposure to de-
monetization is the percentage change in total deposits between the end of the fourth 
quarter of 2016 and end of the third quarter of 2016. This captures deposit growth during 
the last quarter of 2016, of which almost two months, November and December, were what 
we loosely refer to as the demonetization period. This data is publicly available from the 
Reserve Bank’s website.17 Since the Reserve Bank publishes total deposits, the percentage 
change is the net growth in deposits. If an account holder deposited a certain amount in 
old currency and replaced it with new currency, the growth in deposits would be zero. In 
reality, due to the severe restrictions in place, the amount of currency in circulation during 
those two months fell dramatically to almost half of its pre-demonetization value making 
this less of a concern.18 
In our econometric analysis, we use this raw deposit growth measure. The mean value 
across districts during that quarter was almost 14% with a standard deviation of 7%. This 
stands in sharp contrast to preceding five years when the mean growth was 1.8% with a 
standard deviation of only 2.5% for the same quarter. Figure 3 displays the time series of 
15See Elvidge, et al (2017). 
16Beyer et al (2018) and Chodorow-Reich et al (2018) post-process the light data and remove some of 
these variations. Since we use lights as a dependent variable, there is no reason to make such corrections. 
Further, despite applying smoothing procedures, the jump in aggregate lights is clearly visible in Figure 6 
of the latter paper. 
17Statement 4A of the Quarterly Statistics on Deposits and Credit of Scheduled Commercial Banks. Total 
deposits usually reflect values for the last day of the quarter. 
18Initially, daily cash withdrawals were restricted to INR 10,000 (US$150) per day with a weekly limit of 
20,000. 
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the unweighted mean of the district deposit growth after subtracting the five year (2011-15) 
average for that district-quarter.19 Figure 4 provides a glimpse of the spatial variation of 
the same growth rate for the demonetization quarter. At the upper end of the distribution, 
there were many districts recording more than 30% growth in deposits. An unusually large 
share of these belong to the northeast states of India, particularly, Nagaland and Manipur. 
This should not come as a surprise for those closely following developments in India during 
that time. The news media reported that the area has many districts that are officially 
“scheduled tribes” designated populations who benefit from income tax exemptions. This 
made them an important conduit for money laundering with reports of chartered planes 
flying in with cash from districts close to New Delhi. A second possibility is that the 
undeclared cash being used by separatist groups that operate in this area made its way 
back to the banks.20 Other than the northeast, the northern states of India had many 
districts with high levels of deposit growth. 
While large increases in deposits are to be expected, there are at least a dozen districts 
that experienced declines during that time period. These are concentrated in metropolitan 
areas. Particularly striking are Mumbai (-16%) and Suburban Mumbai (-2%). Chennai 
also experienced a decline of -0.4%. More generally, at the lower end of the distribution we 
see a predominance of major urban areas such as Bangalore, Delhi, Hyderabad, Kolkata, 
etc.21 The fact that these are all urban areas could mean that there was less dependence 
on cash to begin with. Second, in keeping with our motivation, it is also possible that a 
large chunk of the undeclared cash was redirected to adjoining rural districts or to other 
parts of the country. Nevertheless, neither of these can explain a decline in total deposits. 
It is likely that Reserve Bank was more responsive, consciously or not, to the cash needs 
in these places which facilitated greater withdrawals compared to the rest of the country. 
Figure 3 also indicates that the rapid growth in deposits in the fourth quarter was largely, 
but not completely, reversed in the first quarter of 2017 as more liquidity flowed into the 
economy. We show that our results remain robust if we use instead the growth in total 
deposits between end of the third quarter of 2016 and end of the first quarter of 2017. 
Census Data In addition to deposits, we also construct district level measures of (a) 
rural population shares, and (b) share of workers in agriculture from the 2011 population 
census. We also use the sixth economic census conducted in 2013-14 to construct a measure 
of the share of workers in small firms to gauge non-agricultural informal activity. We 
    
deposity,q 
P
2015 deposity,q 19For each district-quarter we calculate: ln − 1 ln . 
deposity,q−1 5 y=2011 deposity,q−1 
20See Huffington Post (2016) on chartered planes flying to Nagaland. India Today (2016) reports on 
effects of insurgency outfits. Interestingly, there is no unusual growth in deposits in the Kashmir region. 
21Because of our use of district FE, time-invariant unobservables associated with these more urban districts 
are not a threat to our identification strategy. 
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define firms that have less than ten workers (hired and owners) as small firms.22 These 
additional district-level variables are used in the analysis of Section 3.2, which examines 
the characteristics of districts that experienced large deposit growth from demonetization. 
Household Data While the first part of the paper focuses on district level variations 
in outcomes, we supplement this by looking at household incomes and expenditures from 
Consumer Pyramids, a proprietary panel survey published by the Centre for Monitoring 
Indian Economy (CMIE). The survey follows almost 160,000 households since 2015 and 
is designed to provide an overview of incomes, expenditures, assets, demographics and 
more recently, employment and sentiments and is representative at the national level.23 
Households are interviewed tri-annually (once every four months) about their economic 
situation over the previous four months. Even though India is about 30% urban and 
70% rural, the survey is flipped in that 70% of the respondents are urban and 30% rural. 
The rationale is the greater heterogeneity in urban households than in rural households. 
We use the survey data to see if household income and expenditures were differentially 
affected post-demonetization. Figure 5 displays the logarithm of the weighted mean of 
household real income and real expenditures based on the survey. Even here, there is a 
clear increase in the slope around the time of demonetization. In addition to looking at 
aggregated income and expenditures, we also examine a particular component of income– 
private transfer income (i.e., remittances from members or other sources). In keeping with 
our regional specifications, we also distinguish between rural and urban households, and 
also between agriculture and non-agricultural households. 
3 Empirical Specifications and Results 
3.1 Regional Effects 
We begin our analysis by looking at the district level variation covering the period from 
January 2015 to May 2018.24 The starting month is chosen based on the availability of 
data for the household level analysis in section 3.3. Additionally, it provides a reasonable 
22The economic census, which surveyed 58.5 million firms, excludes establishments that engage in crop 
production and plantation (i.e. most of the agricultural sector), and public services. However, it includes 
allied agricultural activities and also government owned production units. Firms may be registered or 
unregistered. 
23To get real measures of income and expenditures, nominal measures from the Consumer Pyramids are 
deflated by state-level, rural/urban measures of CPI from the Consumer Price Indices Warehouse provided 
by the Government of India. We use the most recent, general data (2012 base), which can be found here: 
http://164.100.34.62:8080/. 
24Extending the sample back to 2014 does not alter our results. 
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balance between the length of pre and post periods. We are able to create consistent data 
for 625 of the 640 districts in the 2011 census.25 
3.1.1 Preliminary Analysis: Testing for Parallel Trends 
The first step of our analysis is to establish that the growth in deposits between quarters 
3 and 4 of 2016 (referred to as “demonetization-centered deposit growth”) is not related 
to pre-trends in nighttime lights. We show this absence of differential pre-trends in two 
ways. First, we examine the interaction between a simple time trend and demonetization-
centered deposit growth on nighttime lights in the pre-period. This tests whether there 
are differential linear trends in the pre-period from a district’s 2016q3-2016q4 growth in 
deposits. In particular, we limit our sample period to that prior to demonetization and 
estimate: 
2016q3−q4 ln Lightsit = α+βT r.T rendt+βT r.×gT rendt×DG +βT r.×xT rendt×Xi+γi+it (1) i 
where our focus is on the coefficient βT r.×g, which estimates whether there are trend 
2016q3−q4 differences associated with demonetization-centered deposit growth, (DGi ).
26 This 
test is estimated in Table 1. All specifications of the table include district fixed effects (γi) 
with standard errors clustered at the district level. Controls are entered as follows: col-
umn (1) estimates the simple within-district trend and its interaction with demonetization-
centered deposit growth; columns (2)-(5) add in the natural log of cloud free days and 
state-specific time trends; column (3) controls for trend differences from population; col-
umn (4) includes trend differences from district geo-climatic conditions; and column (5) 
includes all controls. As shown, in no specification of Table 1 do we estimate statistically 
different trends associated with the change in deposits, and magnitudes of the interaction 
are close to zero. The negative coefficient on the interaction of interest also suggests that our 
measure of exposure to demonetization is not associated with positive trends in nighttime 
lights prior to treatment. 
To further show parallel trends in the effect of demonetization-centered deposit growth 
on nighttime lights prior to the shock in November 2016, Figure 6 plots the monthly βt 
from the following estimating equation, using (i.e., omitting) October of 2016 as the base 
25The Reserve Bank of India updates its tables periodically following the formation of new districts. We 
lose some districts that were split after the 2011 census for which no clear parent district could be assigned. 
Additionally, the Bank does not collect data for the nine separate districts of Delhi. As a result, Delhi, 
and also the union territories of Chandigarh and Dadra and Nagar Haveli are automatically dropped during 
estimation since they have no within region variation. 
26For all districts, T rendt takes the value of 1 for the first month of our analysis, 2 for the second month, 
etc. 
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month: 
May2018X 
2016q3−q4 ln Lightsit = α + βtMontht × DGi + γi + γst + it (2) 
t=Jan.2015 
Equation (2) tests for differential monthly effects of demonetization-centered deposit growth 
on nighttime lights relative to the month prior to demonetization, and in order to test the 
simple relationship over time, only district (γi) and state-year-month (γst) are included.
27 
In other words, if demonetization-centered deposit growth is accounting only for spatial 
differences in the effect of demonetization as we hypothesize, then there should be no con-
sistently estimated effect of 2016q3-2016q4 deposit growth on nighttime lights prior to de-
monetization. Indeed, monthly effects of demonetization-centered deposit growth in Figure 
6 show a noisy, but inconsistent association with nighttime lights prior to demonetization. 
Coupled with the findings Table 1, we interpret no observable differences in the trend of 
nighttime lights from our measure of demonetization intensity prior to November 2016. 
Following demonetization in November 2016, however, two patterns emerge. First, 
districts that exhibited larger deposit growth during demonetization, or districts that we 
interpret to have been more exposed to demonetization, have relative declines in night-
time lights in the months during and immediately after demonetization. After this initial 
decline, however, these districts that were more exposed to demonetization show relative 
increases in nighttime lights. Monthly coefficients of 2016q3-2016q4 deposit growth for the 
post-demonetization period are consistently positive, statistically significant, and larger in 
magnitude than in any month during the noisy pre-period, suggesting a clear break from the 
macroeconomic shock under study. We next study these during- and post-demonetization 
effects through difference-in-differences analysis. 
3.1.2 Short and Medium Term Impacts of Demonetization 
Our baseline analysis explores the relative within-district aggregate impacts of demoneti-
zation using nighttime lights. To do so, we estimate district-level difference-in-differences 
in nighttime lights from spatial variation in the pre/post quarterly change in deposits fol-
lowing the enactment of demonetization in November of 2016. This is given formally by 
the following estimating equation: 
2016q3−q4 2016q3−q4 ln Lightsit = α + βDIDuring × DG + βP IP ost × DGi i 
(3) 
+ β0 XXi + γi + γst + it 
27Coefficients from Equation (2), which are shown in Figure 6, are slightly attenuated with similar sta-
tistical significance when including baseline controls of Equation (3). 
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The base district panel is monthly (t), running from January 2015 to May 2018, and is 
comprised of 625 (i) districts. District (γi) and state-year-month (γst) are included in all 
specifications, suggesting our coefficient is capturing state-specific within-district variation 
over time.28 Our coefficients of interest βD and βP measure the differential change to night 
time lights during and following demonetization by relative exposure to demonetization– 
2016q3−q4 measured by the influx in deposits due to demonetization (DGi ). We separately 
estimate the immediate effect of demonetization (November and December of 2016) to 
account for initial disruptions due to the large reductions in currency and its impacts on 
transactions, suggesting βD < 0. As argued in the introduction, the raw aggregate data 
portray not only the absence of negative economic effects, but a consistent positive effects; 
therefore, we hypothesize βP > 0. The dual inclusion of during and post interactions implies 
the coefficients of these interactions is accounting for the relative effect demonetization 
compared to the pre-period of January 2015 to October 2016. 
Table 2 formally tests this idea by estimating our base DD equation given by Equation 
(3). All estimations include district and state-year-month fixed effects, and standard errors 
are clustered at the district level.29 Column (1) estimates the DD bivariate equation, omit-
ting other controls. Columns (2)-(5) include the natural log of cloud free days. Since lights 
are strongly correlated with population, column (3) includes the district-level population 
(2011 Census). Our final set of controls comprises a large range of district-level geoclimatic 
conditions that are piecemeal included in column (4); these include the average and stan-
dard deviations for temperature, precipitation, malaria ecology, ruggedness, agricultural 
land suitability, the average distance to the coast, land area, and indicators for biomes.30 
Both the population controls of column (3) and the geoclimatic controls of column (4) are 
time invariant, so to include them in our within-district estimations, we interact all con-
trols with a during-demonetization indicator and a post-demonetization indicator; this is 
identical to how our regressor of interest (deposit growth Q3-Q4, 2016) is treated. Doing 
so allows us to control for differential post-demonetization trends that may be correlated 
with 2016q3-2016q4 deposit growth. All controls are included in column (5). 
For all specifications of Table 2, a clear pattern exists: there is a statistically significant 
(p < 0.01) negative relationship between night time lights and demonetization-centered 
28Our results are not dependent on using state-year-month FE. When using year-month FE, the post-
demonetization increases associated with demonetization-centered deposit growth remains roughly similar 
in magnitude and statistical significance. 
29Table 2 also includes within district spatially adjusted standard errors for 30km (in brackets, “[ ]”) and 
200km (in braces, “{ }”) (Fetzer, 2014; Hsiang, 2010). Given the close similarity between the district-
clustered standard errors and the standard errors with spatial adjustments, we simply report district-
clustered standard errors after Table 2. 
30All geographic variables are taken from Chanda and Kabiraj (2018) except for the biome indicators 
which are taken from Henderson et al (2018). 
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deposit growth in the immediate months during demonetization, but this initial negative 
relationship is offset by a rebounding statistically significant (p < 0.01) positive effect 
throughout 2017 and mid-2018. From the simple estimation of column (1) to our full 
baseline model of column (5), there is very little variation in either the magnitude or the 
significance of our main coefficients. Magnitudes are slightly attenuated in column (3) 
when separately controlling for the pre-period level of population, but the estimated effects 
remain statistically significant at the 1% level. Using the range of estimated magnitudes 
from column (2), a standard deviation increase in a district’s deposit growth from demon-
etization (s.d.=0.07) is associated with an average monthly decrease of 4-6% in nighttime 
lights during demonetization (i.e., November and December 2016) and an average monthly 
increase of 3-5% from January 2017 to May 2018.31 Since lights by themselves are difficult 
to interpret, one can use estimated measures of elasticity between lights and GDP. Hu and 
Yao (2019) estimate the elasticity of VIIRS nighttime lights and GDP to be unity.32 In 
other words, a one standard deviation increase in deposit growth during demonetization is 
associated with a 3-5% increase in GDP as well. 
3.1.3 Placebo Tests and Robustness 
Alternative Timing We next show that our measure of intensity–the growth rate of 
deposits centered around demonetization–is indeed accounting for district level exposure 
to demonetization. To do so, we alternate both the treatment date of demonetization and 
look at potential effects from the quarterly change in deposits in other periods. 
Table 3 re-estimates our baseline findings of Table 2 but shifts the treatment date 
one year early to November of 2015. This shift generally causes all significant estimates to 
dissipate. The decline during demonetization in Table 2 is now estimated to be close to zero 
and is statistically insignificant in all specifications. The same holds true for the previously 
estimated post-December increase, which is now negative and statistically insignificant for 
all specifications. Given that demonetization is considered to be a true macroeconomic 
shock, it is no surprise that the true date of the treatment is associated with changes to 
nighttime lights. 
Alternative Intensity In addition to confirming the treatment date, Figure 7 shows that 
it is indeed the change in deposits around demonetization that is driving our results. Figure 
7 plots the during-demonetization (subfigure a) and the post-demonetization coefficients 
31Effects are relative to the pre-period. 
32Commonly referred estimates such as those of Henderson et al (2012) and Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin 
(2016) are based on the older DMSP satellite program, which used an entirely different measurement scale 
and is thus not suitable here. 
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(subfigure b) by each quarterly growth rate of deposits. That is, we re-estimate Equation 
(3) substituting the quarterly deposit growth around demonetization (2016q3-2016q4) with 
all other quarterly changes to deposits.33 
For the during-demonetization interaction, the quarterly change in deposits one year 
prior to demonetization (2015q3-2015q4) also has a statistically significant negative effect 
on nighttime lights, suggesting a potential alternative channel between deposit growth in 
quarters 3 and 4 and the decline in nighttime lights immediately following demonetization. 
With this in mind, we next control for average quarterly deposit growth and deposit growth 
one year and one quarter prior to demonetization in Table 4. The inclusion of early deposit 
growth measures does not alter the estimated effect of demonetization-centered deposit 
growth found in Table 2. For the post-demonetization increase, however, the only quarterly 
change in deposits that has a positive and statistically significant association with nighttime 
lights is the change centered around demonetization, providing further evidence that our 
use of deposit growth rates from demonetization are indeed measuring (at least in part) the 
spatial intensity of demonetization. In Section 3.2 we further explore the characteristics of 
district exposure to demonetization. 
Robustness to Pretrends Table 4 controls for a number of potential trends in the pre-
period (January 2015-October 2016); specifically, the average pre-period quarter-to-quarter 
percent change in deposits, the average growth of nighttime lights, and the growth of de-
posits one quarter (2016q2-2016q3) and one year (2015q3-2015q4) prior to demonetization. 
All estimations include the baseline set of controls given by column (5) of Table 2. 
Some districts may be subject to either more variation in quarter-to-quarter deposit 
growth or may be more vulnerable to changes in deposits that could potentially lead to a 
spurious association with post-demonetization increases in nighttime lights. Therefore, we 
control for the average quarter-to-quarter growth of deposits in column (1). The inclusion 
of average deposit growth does not substantially affect our coefficients of interest, again 
suggesting that our baseline measure of deposit growth is measuring spatial differences in 
demonetization. 
Although pre-trends in nighttime lights appear to be absent in Table 1 and Figure 6, 
we also control for the post-demonetization change in nighttime lights associated with pre-
demonetization trends to show that our main finding is independent of ongoing trends in 
night-tme lights. To do so, column (2) controls for during/post-demonetization indicators 
interacted with the average monthly district-level growth rate in lights from January 2015-
October 2016. The inclusion of this control leads to a slight attenuation in the effects 
both during and after demonetization, with the during-demonetization decline becoming 
33The estimated coefficients follow the specification of column (5) of Table 2. 
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statistically indistinguishable from zero. The post-demonetization increase in nighttime 
lights, however, remains both positive and statistically significant. 
Column (3) includes both the pre-period average growth rate of lights and deposits. The 
joint inclusion of these controls does not alter the estimated post-demonetization increase, 
further suggesting that our spatial measure of intensity is not being driven by pre-period 
trends in either our outcome or regressor of interest. 
While Figure 7 shows that no other quarter-to-quarter growth rate is associated with the 
post-demonetization increase in nighttime lights, we take this one step further by controlling 
for the quarterly change in deposits one quarter and one year early in column (4) of Table 4. 
The inclusion of additional quarterly deposit growth measures does not alter the coefficient 
of demonetization-centered deposit growth. 
Additional Robustness Checks We perform a number of additional robustness checks 
that follow the format of Table 2; these tables are found in the appendix. To quickly 
summarize: (1) we extend the sample period back to 2014 in Table A2; (2) we examine 
the relationship between nighttime lights and deposit growth one quarter longer (2017q1) 
in Table A3; (3) we mask the nighttime lights measure by whether lights were present in 
2015, thereby testing the extensive margin in Table A4; (4) in place of the log of nighttime 
lights, we examine the monthly growth rate (or the log difference) in Table A5; (5) we also 
examine the growth rate with the longer growth rate of deposits of Table A3 in Table A6, 
and (6) re-estimate our base results with the growth rate of the masked light data in Table 
A7. For all specifications, a statistically significant positive post-demonetization effect is 
estimated, providing further support our baseline findings of Table 2. 
3.2 Saliency of Demonetization: Rural, Agricultural, and Informal Sec-
tors 
The National Commission for Enterprises in the Unorganised Sector estimated that in 2004-
05, 92.3% of India’s workforce was informal.34 By definition, almost 100% of agriculture is 
informal, whereas about 72% of non-agriculture was informal in 2004-05. They note that 
this was higher than in 1999-2000.35 One of the major concerns during demonetization was 
the asymmetric costs borne by the rural and the informal sectors of the economy which 
34See NCEUS (2009). The commission defines the informal sector as consisting of all unincorporated 
private enterprises owned by individuals or households engaged in the sale and production of goods and 
services operated on a proprietary or partnership basis and with less than ten total workers. This includes 
all of agriculture except for corporate ownership and plantations The report also differentiates between 
informal sector and informal workers. The latter can include workers in the formal sector but those that do 
not receive employee and social security benefits (ibid, p12 ). 
35This persistence is also confirmed by Ghani et al (2013) for the non-agricultural sector. 
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did not have easy access, if any at all, to the formal financial system. On the other hand, 
the government itself was of the view that demonetization would push more economic 
activity and workers towards the formal sector. A natural extension of this research is 
to examine the relationship between a district level measures of the rural and informal 
sectors, and the change in deposits centered around demonetization. In particular, we look 
at three variables, (a) agricultural labor share, (b) a district’s rural population share and 
(c) share of the non-agricultural labor force in firms with less than ten employees. Table 
5 lists the correlation between deposit growth and the three measures. Not surprisingly, 
the correlation between the agricultural labor share and rural population shares is high. 
The correlation between the three structural variables and demonetization quarter deposit 
growth is also evident, but is not so high as to make one wonder if they capture essentially 
the same thing. In Figure 8, we plot the coefficient of a district’s measures for these variables 
when regressing the quarterly change in deposits for every quarter. All three measures are 
generally unrelated to the change in deposits, except for the change around demonetization 
the coefficient of each measure shows a clear, positive, and statistically significant spike. 
This is expected. The rural and informal sector are predominantly currency driven, and the 
overnight effort to remove the most common Rupee notes is expected to be more pronounced 
in these rural districts. Indeed, that is what is borne out in the data. 
Further exploring the effects of rural/informal districts, Figure 9 plots event figures 
similar to that of Figure 6, replacing the log change in deposits with - agricultural labor 
(subfigure a), rural shares (subfigure b), and non-agricultural informal share (subfigure 
c). The effect of each is remarkably similar to that of demonetization-centered deposit 
growth: there is no clear pattern prior to demonetization; during demonetization all mea-
sures of intensity have statistically significant negative associations with nighttime lights; 
and throughout 2017 and early 2018 a statistically significant positive effect is estimated. 
Table 6 replaces the quarterly change in deposits of Table 2 with the share of agricul-
tural laborers in Panel A, informal share of labor force in Panel B, and the rural share of 
the population in Panel C. The estimated effects are consistent with the deposit change es-
timates of with lights. All three mirror the event plots of Figure 9 by estimating a negative 
effect of demonetization in the immediate months during/after the announcement, but this 
negative effect is short lived with the post-demonetization period showing improvements 
in output (proxied by lights) in the following 17 months. The magnitude of the point esti-
mates is remarkably similar to each other and to our base measure of deposit change. For 
the column (5) specification, a one standard deviation increase in the agricultural share 
is associated with an 8.1% monthly increase in nighttime lights ;a one standard deviation 
increase in the share of labor working in small firms is associated with a 4.8% increase; 
and a one standard deviation increase in the rural share of the population leads to a 7.8% 
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monthly increase. 
To summarize, our measures of rural, and the agricultural and informal economy, reflect 
the same effects as the proximate measure of deposit growth. While the negative effects 
during the months of demonetization are indeed in keeping with concerns about the asym-
metric burden of the policy, the medium term effects are quite the opposite. While it is 
possible that this reflects increases in formalization, we do not have compelling data on 
formalization per se. In any case, light data should not be as sensitive to the economy 
moving from informal activity to formal activity. After all, one of the widely recognized 
advantages of using lights is that it captures informal activity. 
3.3 Household Survey Analysis 
As a complement to our aggregate analysis, we also examine the effects of demonetization 
using a monthly longitudinal household panel. The panel allows us to independently verify 
our aggregate findings while also providing a rich source of data to examine potential mech-
anisms. Given our finding on nighttime lights, which proxy output, our primary focus in 
the household panel is in examining the effect on income and expenditures. Specifically, we 
are interested in seeing whether (1) that following demonetization income and expenditures 
increased, and (2) this increase is more pronounced in rural, agricultural households that 
live in districts with greater exposure to demonetization. We will also use this survey (along 
with other aggregate data) to explore mechanisms, but as discussed in detail in Section 4, 
we find no single cause for the post-demonetization increases. 
Figure 10 plots the effect of year-month indicators, relative to the month prior to de-
monetization (October 2016). Subfigure (a) plots the effect of these time-period effects 
on the natural log of total household income, while Subfigure (b) plots the same for the 
natural log of total expenditures. From (a), there are no trends prior to our omitted month 
of October 2016; however, following demonetization in November 2016, there is a clear and 
stark increase in a household’s reported income. This figure corroborates the increase in 
lights from Figure 1 and the estimated increase of our baseline findings. For expenditures 
in Subfigure (b), a similar pattern is observed; although, there are statistically significant 
differences occurring throughout the pre-period that suggest some seasonality or higher 
relative spending during 2015 compared to 2016. Nevertheless, both measures show clear 
increases following demonetization, a finding consistent with our aggregate analysis. 
The clearest replication of our baseline finding would be to aggregate households to the 
district level, then repeat our district estimations of Table 2. This district-level aggregation, 
however, is problematic due to characteristics of the household sample, which oversamples 
urban households and omits districts in the northeast.36 This is especially problematic 
36We perform a number of tests using the weights provided by CMIE. Weighting generally brings estimates 
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for our analysis because as shown in Section 3.2, the effects of demonetization are more 
pronounced for rural, agricultural populations. 
To overcome this sampling issue, we focus on household characteristics associated with 
demonetization: rural and agricultural occupation households.37 In so doing, our primary 
estimation strategy for the household panel is of the following form: 
yhit = α + βDIDuring × Rh + βP IP ost × Rh + β
0 (4) XXhit + γh + γst + hit 
We regress monthly (t) total income and expenditures (y) for h households in i districts 
on the interaction between rural or agricultural occupation households (Rh) and the inital 
(IDuring) and post (IP ost) demonetization periods. In other words, we estimate the differen-
tial effect in income/expenditure from rural or agricultural occupation households by month 
across relevant time periods. Our hypothesis is that the increases following demonetization 
in income and expenditures observed in Figure 10 are more pronounced among these groups, 
so that these groups should have relative increases compared to urban or non-agricultural 
households. All household-level regressions also include household (γh) and state-by-year-
month (γt) fixed effects, all district-level controls considered in Table 2 (interacted with 
during- and post- demonetization indicators), and fixed effects for household size, earning 
members in the household, and months prior to interview.38 
We are also interested in whether household effects are uniform by district. We expect 
to see large effects in rural/agriculture households in districts that were more exposed to 
demonetization (measured by demonetization-centered deposit growth). In other words, 
the hypothesized increase in income/expenditures for rural households should be larger if 
that household lives in a district that is more exposed to demonetization. To do so, we 
estimate an interaction of the following form: 
yhit = α + βD1IDuring × Rh + βP 1IP ost × Rh 
2016q3−q4 2016q3−q4 + βD2IDuring × DGi + βP 2IP ost × DGi 
(5) 
2016q3−q4 2016q3−q4 + βD3IDuring × Rh × DG + βP 3IP ost × Rh × DGi i 
+ β0 XXhit + γh + γst + hit 
2016q3−q4 Where R is an indicator for either rural or agricultural occupation households, DGi 
more in line with our findings from nighttime lights, but the supplied weights are for national representation, 
not district aggregations. 
37Agricultural households are defined as those where at least one member of the household reports their 
occupation as an agricultural laborer, a small farmer (those engaged only in subsistence farming), or an 
organized farmer (farmers that sell their produce). 
38The CMIE samples households 3 times per year. Households then report their monthly income, etc. for 
the past 4 months. 
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is district-level, demonetization-centered deposit growth used in the previous regional anal-
ysis, and all other notation is identical to Equation (4). Again, our hypothesis is that βP 3, 
which measures the differential effect in income/consumption for rural/ag. households by 
district level exposure to demonetization, is positive. This positive coefficient suggests rel-
ative increases for rural or agricultural households in more exposed districts compared to 
the pre-demonetization period. 
Estimates from Equations (4) and (5) are given for rural households in Table 7 and 
agricultural occupation households in Table 8. Columns (1) and (2) regress the natural log 
of household income, while columns (3) and (4) regress the natural log of household expen-
ditures. Equation(4), which estimates direct household effects, is given by odd-numbered 
columns, and the interaction model of Equation (5) is estimated in even numbered columns. 
All household estimations include household and state-year-month FE, controls for house-
hold characteristics, and district controls (interacted with IDuring and IP ost). While not 
shown, the piecemeal introduction of controls does not affect our coefficients of interest. As 
with our base analysis, standard errors are clustered at the district level. 
Column (1) of Table 7 shows that rural households did have a relative increase in income 
compared to urban households. The average monthly income is roughly 2% larger, but sta-
tistically insignificant for rural households during the demonetization period of November 
and December 2016, and 4% larger following demonetization (weakly significant). Look-
ing at the interaction between rural households and district deposit growth in column 
(2), the post-demonetization monthly increase in income is driven by rural households 
living in exposed districts. The increase for rural households in districts with a median 
demonetization-centered deposit is 3% for post-demonetization months. Considering dis-
tricts that were more exposed to demonetization (90th percentile), the average monthly 
increase in income becomes 9.4% following demonetizaton. 
For expenditures, a similar pattern is observed, but the post-demonetization increase is 
now statistically insignificant on average. When examining the effect by district exposure, 
however, we see statistically significant increases in expenditures in the post-demonetization 
months for rural households. This relative increase in expenditures increases from an aver-
age monthly increase of 1.2% for the median district (statistically insignificant) to 4% for 
district’s at the 90th percentile of our exposure variable (p < 0.01). 
By-month estimates of Table 7 are given in Figure 11. Figure 11 plots the monthly coef-
ficient from regressing the natural log of income and expenditures on an indicator for rural 
households for either households either above or below the median district deposit growth. 
As seen, there is no clean increase in income for rural households post-demonetization. Ex-
penditures show a clearer story. For rural households in exposed districts, there is a clear 
increase in expenditures in the post-demonetization period. This effect, however, is absent 
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for those rural households in districts with less exposure. 
The estimates of Table 7 are replicated in Table 8, but in place of rural households 
we consider agricultural households. Agricultural households are defined as those where at 
least one member of the household reports their occupation as an agricultural laborer, a 
small farmer (those engaged only in subsistence farming), or an organized farmer (farmers 
that sell their produce). The estimates are very similar to rural households. Agricultural 
households had relative increases in income after demonetization, and these increases are 
driven by households in exposed districts. On average, agricultural households had an esti-
mated monthly income increase of 12.6% in the months following demonetization (column 
1). Moreover, this increase in expenditures is tied to a district’s demonetization-centered 
deposit growth (column 2), from which those in the 90th percentile of district exposure had 
monthly increases of 21.4%. Expenditures show a similar, but smaller in magnitude effect 
as income: an average post-demonetization monthly increase of 1.6%, and households in 
highly exposed districts have an estimated increase of 4.4%. To summarize our results, ru-
ral and agricultural households have greater increases in income following demonetization, 
and this increase is driven mostly by households in more demonetized districts, a finding 
consistent with our base nighttime lights analysis of Table 2. 
Figure 12 replicates Figures 11 , replacing the rural household indicator with an indicator 
for the head of the household having an agricultural occupation. The estimated effects for 
agricultural households are similar to those for rural households. While there is a clear 
increase in expenditures following demonetization, the income results are not clear. 
4 Mechanisms 
Our main finding is that demonetization led to longer term increases in output–measured 
by nighttime lights, income, and expenditures. This increase occurred after an initial 
decline due to chaos from eliminating the most commonly used currency notes in a cash-
heavy economy. As far as we know, we are the first to show this increase, which runs 
counter to other research papers in addition to the common narrative in the media. In the 
introduction we highlighted two channels that motivate this research. In particular, in this 
section we discuss these two further. First, we use the household survey to in an effort to 
gain insights on the reallocation and redistribution mechanism. Second, we examine the 
regional dynamics of credit. The evidence presented here provides limited support for both 
of these rationales. 
Redistribution/Money Laundering As discussed already, money laundering involved 
various channels. One potential mechanism for the post-demonetization increase could be 
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tied to redistribution effects from wealthy hoarders of cash. In order to avoid taxes on large 
cash holdings, cash may have been redistributed to either family members or employees or 
even rerouted through brokers who found other individuals with low account balances. This 
in effect would be a transitory income shock for mostly poor households. Similarly other 
potential mechanisms would be receiving salaries in advance and the settlement of unpaid 
debt. In these situations, poorer household would likely have been the main beneficiaries. 
To examine this potential redistribution, Table 9 examines the effect of rural and agri-
cultural households on income derived from private transfers, which is defined as “income 
a household receives from a family member as a remittance, or as a gift or donation from 
any non-government agency”. This measure of income directly accounts for the potential 
redistributive effects from demonetization. In other words, increases in income from private 
transfers would be indicative of increased redistribution, which can be seen as a transitory 
income shock. 
Indeed, we do find that rural/agricultural households have statistically significant in-
creases in income from private transfers in Table 9; however, this increase occurred after 
demonetization, not during. Columns (1) and (2) respectively examine the direct and in-
teractive effects for rural households, while columns (3) and (4) mirror the estimates of 
(1) and (2) for agricultural households. On average, rural households show a statistically 
significant decline of 3% per month in income from private transfers during demoneti-
zation that is followed by a 3% increase following demonetization. As with income and 
expenditures, this effect is driven by households in more exposed districts (measured by 
district demonetization-centered deposit growth), with the during-demonetization decline 
and post-demonetization increase increasing in magnitude with district exposure–i.e., a dur-
ing demonetization decline of 3% at the median versus a 5% decline at the 90th percentile, 
and a post-demonetization increase of 3% at the median versus a 7% increase at the 90th 
percentile. A similar pattern is seen for agricultural households, which show on average 
a 3% monthly decline during demonetization, followed by a post-demonetization monthly 
increase of 2%. As with rural households, the magnitude of this average effect is increased 
by the household’s district’s exposure to demonetization. 
While an increase in income from private transfers is suggestive of redistribution, this 
increase should have occurred during demonetization, not months after. Going further, 
Figure 13 shows the month by month association of rural and agricultural households with 
private transfers. As seen, the post-demonetization increase from private transfers begins 
almost a year after demonetization in September 2017, a time well after we would expect. 
Given that these are self-reported measures of income, there may be some recollection 
or reporting bias–either accidentally or deliberately given potential legal issues from tax 
avoidance. Nevertheless, it makes the evidence less compelling. 
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Credit Our primary way of measuring the spatial intensity of demonetization is to use 
the increase in banking deposits as shown in Figure 3. While banks were initially flush 
with deposits, these were obviously temporary. This is seen by the immediate outflow of 
deposits the quarter after demonetization in the same figure. Given this short term influx 
of available funds, banks would not be incentivized to make longer term loans.39 
What is of greater interest is whether there could be medium term effects of district 
variation in the influx of deposits, i.e. individuals did not feel the need to withdraw all 
of their deposits and the government was thus possibly partly successful in channeling 
cash back into the formal banking system. Also, if a portion of the deposits could be 
attributed to the redistribution channel, there is even less reason for all deposits to be 
withdrawn. Figure 3 suggests that these might have been at play. To better account for 
this longer term increase in deposits and any potential effects on credit, we again perform 
a DD estimation. However, more appropriately, we the use longer term deposit increases -
the growth in deposits between Q3 2016 and Q1 2017 as our measure of treatment intensity. 
Table 10 replicates our base analysis of Table 2, regressing the natural log of quarterly 
district-level credit on longer run deposit growth (2016q3-2017q1) - during demonetiza-
tion (i.e., 2016q4) and post-demonetization. As shown, we estimate no changes to credit 
associated with this longer term deposit growth during demonetization, but in the quar-
ters after, we observe a statistically significant increase in credit. In other words, districts 
that had longer-term increases in deposits also had increases in credit. In particular, the 
estimates of Table 10 suggest a 10 percentage point increase in longer run demonetization-
centered deposit growth is associated with a 1.5-2.2% quarterly increase in credit following 
demonetization. This effect is also seen in Figure 14, which plots the quarterly association 
between the 2016q3-2017q1 deposit growth and credit. There is a clear increase following 
demonetization that is absent in the pre-period. 
Appendix Table A8 replaces the longer term growth in deposits with our base measure 
(2016q3-2016q4; Panel A), the share of employment in the agricultural sector (Panel B), 
the share of small firms in non-agricultural employment (Panel C), and the rural share of 
the population (Panel D). In general, effects are similar; although, not always statistically 
significant. 
In short, it appears that districts that were more exposed to demonetization did experi-
ence a subsequent growth in credit. One concern is that districts that were more exposed to 
demonetization, had differential pre-trends in credit. In subfigures (b) of A1, and (a) and 
39Indeed, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) required this initial influx of deposits to be held as reserves, 
requiring all additional deposits between September 16th and November 11th to be held as reserves. To 
compensate interest paid on deposits, however, the 100% reserve ratio period was ended and followed by 
the RBI issuing short-term debt (Chodorow-Reich et al. 2018). As a result of these actions, the stock of 
money (i.e., M3) remained relatively constant (Figure 2b) 
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(b) of A2 of the appendix, we plot the quarterly effect of agricultural employment share, 
non agricultural small-firm share, and the rural share of the population on district credit. 
Prior to demonetization, there is a clear increasing trend for districts among all three di-
mensions, suggesting the post-demonetization increase estimated in Tables 10 and A8 is 
simply a continuation of this trend and not an increase from the demonetization shock. 
Nevertheless it does not completely refute our hypothesis. First, most banks in India are 
state owned, and credit often follows state directed priorities such as lending to agriculture 
and small scale industry on lenient terms, over and above meeting targets to these and 
other priority sectors. Cole (2009) also notes that agricultural credit tends to follow elec-
tion cycles. Gupta et al (2015) note that, despite the removal of various restrictions since 
the onset of economic reforms in 1991, banks have continued to lend to state governments 
and state operated entities. Given this backdrop, it is not surprising that while we do see 
a significant effect, the parallel trends assumption is questionable. 
5 Conclusion 
If there is one thing that is clear from our analysis, it is that the medium term regional 
effects of India’s demonetization experiment was quite different, if not the polar opposite 
of the short run disruption. Along with work by others, we find that initial chaos from the 
shock led to a temporary reduction in economic activity. Throughout 2017 (and to the most 
recent periods for which data is available) the initial declines were overcome and surpassed 
by increases in economic activity. These expansionary effects of demonetization are seen 
in a number of raw statistics, from night time lights (Figure 1) to household income and 
expenditures (Figure 5). 
To identify spatial variation in the effects of demonetization, we focus on deposit growth 
between the quarters preceding and following demonetization. While capturing the regular 
deposit of notes, this is also conducive to picking up the spatial aspects of money laundering. 
Ideally, one would like to have even more granular account data. Nevertheless, deposit 
growth turns out to be quite informative on its own. To measure differences in economic 
activity within India, we used a monthly panel of unsaturated nighttime lights from 2015 
to the most recently available data of mid-2018. Taken together and given the nature of 
demonetization—an unanticipated macroeconomic shock, our primary analysis examines 
differential trends following demonetization from differences in demonetization-centered 
deposit growth. 
Our primary evidence for the effects of demonetization are given by Figure 6 and Table 
2, where we show that compared to the months preceding demonetization, there is a clear 
decline during the enactment of demonetization in November and December of 2016, but 
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after this initial disturbance, there is a clear positive impact. The positive effect is robust 
to many specifications and controls. Next, we show, best captured in Figure 8, strong 
associations between demonetization-centered deposit growth and characteristics of districts 
that would be expected to have more informal, cash heavy activity: districts with a greater 
share of the labor force in either agricultural work or in small firms and generally more rural 
districts. Table 6 confirms the use of the alternative measures of intensity of demonetization 
by showing each measure has the same pattern as our base analysis of Table 2 
We extend our analysis to a panel of households. Supporting our district analysis, we 
estimate relative increases in income and expenditures for rural and agricultural households 
following demonetization. We also show substantial heterogeneity by district-level expo-
sure to demonetization: rural/agricultural households in districts with greater exposure to 
demonetization had significantly larger increase in both expenditures and income. 
In a preliminary analysis, we explore two potential channels: redistribution and credit. 
The evidence is only suggestive due to issues such as timing and parallel trends. Thus, 
while we are confident in the increase in economic activity, more work needs to be done 
to find the precise causes. The increase can hardly be attributed to the avowed gains 
from demonetization. While the government might have counted on large scale wealth 
shocks, increased tax base, and reduction in counterfeit currency, the evidence indicates 
that the effects of these, at least at the time of writing were minimal. Finally, while we 
have discussed unintended redistribution, one cannot rule out another crucial aspect of 
intertemporal optimization- the role of expectations. Jappelli and Pistaferri (2010) note 
that transitory shocks might have different implications if they also alter expectations 
about future policy.This might very well have been the case, especially in light of the 
resounding election success of the incumbent party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 
in 2019.40 To conclude, India’s experiment with demonetization was a unique episode in 
macroeconomic policy making. Our findings highlight the fact that much more research is 
needed to understand both intended and unintended consequences. 
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Figure 1: Nighttime Lights (India, demeaned) 
Summary & Notes: This figure plots nighttime lights–demeaned by month and cloud free 
days–by month. As seen, this relatively unaltered data shows a clear increase in nighttime lights 
following demonetization in November of 2016. 
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Summary & Notes: Sub-figure (a) plots the annual growth rates in quarterly 
real GDP after subtracting the 2012-15 mean growth for the corresponding 
quarter. The red vertical line marks the demonetization quarter (2016q4). 
Sub-figure (b) plots the normalized values for the four series. All series are 
normalized with respect to the quarter preceding demonetization (2016q3). 
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Figure 3: Quarterly Growth in Deposits 
Summary & Notes: This figure plots the mean of district level quarterly growth rate of deposits 
relative to the quarterly mean (2011-2015 average of corresponding quarters). As shown, there is a 
large relative increase in deposits centered around demonetization. 
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Figure 4: 4th Quarter Deposit Growth by District 
Summary & Notes: This map shows the district level quarterly growth rate of deposits between 
the 3rd and 4th Quarter of 2016 relative to the quarterly mean (2011-2015 average growth for the 
corresponding district and quarter). Districts are based on the 2011 census. 
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Ln Household Real Expenditures--- Ln Household Real lncom 
Figure 5: Real Household Income and Expenditures (Consumer Pyramids) 
Summary & Notes: The figure shows household expenditures and incomes from the Consumer 
Pyramid survey. It only includes households used in our empirical analysis- those with responses 
for at least 12 months each, preceding and following demonetization. The values are deflated using 
the CPI (base 2012=100). Survey weights were used to arrive at the mean values depicted in the 
figure. 
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Table 1: Parallel Trends? 
Dependent variable: ln of monthly night time lights, Jan. 2015 - Oct. 2016 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Trend × Deposit Growth, 2016q3-2016q4 0.001 -0.001 0.004 -0.010 -0.006 
(0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) 
Trend -0.008 ∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.041 ∗∗∗ 0.028 ∗∗ 0.003 
(0.002) (0.006) (0.011) (0.013) (0.015) 
Controls: 
ln Cloud Free Days N Y Y Y Y 
ln Population c.2011 × Trend N N Y N Y 
Geoclimatic Controls × Trend N N N Y Y 
District FE Y Y Y Y Y 
State trends N Y Y Y Y 
Observations 13750 13750 13750 13750 13750 
R Sqr. 0.842 0.883 0.883 0.884 0.884 
Summary & Notes: The insignificant interaction between the trend variable and the growth of 
deposits from demonetization is suggestive that linear trends were indeed parallel prior to 
treatment. Growth of Deposits is the district-level percentage change in deposits from quarter 3 to 
quarter 4 of 2016; a time range that captures demonetization. Standard errors are clustered by 
district, and statistical signficance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels is respectively denoted by ***, **, 
and *. 
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Figure 6: Event Figure- Growth of Deposits 2016q3-2016q4 
Summary & Notes: This figure plots the relationship between our primary measure of 
demonetization intensity and nighttime lights by month, omitting the period prior to 
demonetization (Oct. 2016). No clear relationship exists prior to demonetization; during 
demonetization a negative coefficient is estimated; and after demonetization a general positive 
relationships is seen. 
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Table 2: Base estimation 
The change in nighttime lights from demonetization 
Dependent variable: ln of monthly night time lights, Jan. 2015 - May 2018 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
IDuring × Deposit Growth, 2016q3-2016q4 -0.689 
∗∗∗ -0.691 ∗∗∗ -0.366 ∗∗ -0.742 ∗∗∗ -0.313 ∗ 
(0.221) (0.222) (0.159) (0.214) (0.168) 
[0.222] [0.224] [0.156] [0.209] [0.164] 
{0.224} {0.228} {0.168} {0.214} {0.175} 
IP ost× Deposit Growth, 2016q3-2016q4 0.533 
∗∗∗ 0.594 ∗∗∗ 0.427 ∗∗∗ 0.764 ∗∗∗ 0.558 ∗∗∗ 
(0.126) (0.127) (0.113) (0.112) (0.115) 
[0.089] [0.089] [0.080] [0.079] [0.081] 
{0.091} {0.092} {0.084} {0.081} {0.086} 
Controls: 
ln Cloud Free Days N Y Y Y Y 
ln Population c.2011 × During & Post N N Y N Y 
Geoclimatic Controls × During & Post N N N Y Y 
District FE Y Y Y Y Y 
State-year-month FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 25625 25625 25625 25625 25625 
R Sqr. 0.941 0.945 0.946 0.947 0.947 
Summary & Notes: This table represents our baseline estimation. We use the quarterly growth 
in deposits from demonetization to measure a district’s intensity of exposure to demonetization. 
We then look at the relative difference on nighttime lights for the initial implementation 
period–i.e., IDuring = 1 for November and December 2016–and at the longer term effects of 
demonetization–i.e., IP ost = 1 for January 2017 till May 2018. Geoclimatic controls include the 
district-level mean and standard deviation of agricultural suitability, precipitation, temperature, 
malaria suitability; and mean of ruggedness, area, coastal land, and indicators for each biome. 
Time invariant controls are interacted with IDuring and IP ost. Standard errors are clustered by 
district in parentheses–“( )”–and by spatially adjusted district for 30km in brackets–“[ ]”–and 
200km in braces–“{ }”. Statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels is respectively denoted 
by ***, **, and *. 
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Table 3: Placebo test: Alternative treatment date 
Dependent variable: ln of monthly night time lights, Jan. 2014 - Oct. 2016 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
IDuring,t−12× Deposit Growth, 2016q3-2016q4 0.036 0.040 0.114 0.031 0.142 
∗ 
(0.098) (0.098) (0.111) (0.087) (0.086) 
IP ost,t−12× Deposit Growth, 2016q3-2016q4 -0.052 -0.054 -0.006 -0.120 -0.094 
(0.085) (0.083) (0.090) (0.084) (0.091) 
Controls: 
ln Cloud Free Days N Y Y Y Y 
ln Population c.2011 × During & Post N N Y N Y 
Geoclimatic Controls × During & Post N N N Y Y 
District FE Y Y Y Y Y 
State-year-month FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 21250 21250 21250 21250 21250 
R Sqr. 0.942 0.945 0.945 0.946 0.946 
Summary & Notes: This table moves the treatment date back by a year to November of 2015. 
Compared to the coefficients of Table 2, the magnitudes are generally lessened and the opposite 
sign, and no statistically significant coefficients are estimated. This table confirms November 2016 
as the true treatment date. Standard errors are clustered by district, and statistical significance at 
the 1, 5, and 10% levels is respectively denoted by ***, **, and *. 
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(a) I During × Qtr.Growth (b) I P ost × Qtr.Growth 
Figure 7: Effects from Quarterly Growth in Deposits for All Quarters
Summary & Notes: This figure plots coefficients from the regression specification of column (5) of Table 2, replacing the change in
deposits centered around demonetization with the specified quarterly change. Sub-figure (a) plots the effect of the specified quarterly
growth of deposits on nighttime lights in the immediate months of demonetization (Nov. and Dec. 2016), and sub-figure (b) plots the same
effect for the subsequent months. The red reference line marks 2016 Q3-Q4 growth in deposits. As seen the largest estimated effect on
nighttime lights is seen for the change in deposits around demonetization. This supports our use of the 2016 Q3-Q4 growth in deposits as a
proxy for the saliencey of demonetization. 
Table 4: Controlling for Pretrends 
Dependent variable: ln of monthly night time lights, Jan. 2015 - May 2018 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
During Demonetization Indicator × 
Deposit Growth, 2016q3-2016q4 -0.3190 ∗ -0.1948 -0.2093 -0.1656 
(0.1681) (0.1879) (0.1800) (0.1735) 
Mean Deposit Growth, 2014q1-2016q3 -0.3618 -0.9665 -0.8340 
(0.8017) (0.7854) (0.7567) 
Mean Light Growth, Jan. 2014-Oct. 2016 -12.8481 ∗∗∗ -12.9554 ∗∗∗ -12.6173 ∗∗∗ 
(1.9896) (1.9739) (1.9564) 
Deposit Growth, 2016q2-2016q3 0.4849 
(0.2989) 
Deposit Growth, 2015q3-2015q4 -0.5834 ∗ 
(0.3373) 
Post Demonetization Indicator × 
Deposit Growth, 2016q3-2016q4 0.5470 ∗∗∗ 0.4643 ∗∗∗ 0.4609 ∗∗∗ 0.5054 ∗∗∗ 
(0.1133) (0.0867) (0.0874) (0.0881) 
Mean Deposit Growth, 2014q1-2016q3 -0.6980 -0.2280 -0.2433 
(0.5221) (0.4135) (0.4025) 
Mean Light Growth, Jan. 2014-Oct. 2016 10.1052 ∗∗∗ 10.0799 ∗∗∗ 10.1913 ∗∗∗ 
(0.7484) (0.7509) (0.7397) 
Deposit Growth, 2016q2-2016q3 -0.0925 
(0.1532) 
Deposit Growth, 2015q3-2015q4 -0.4613 ∗∗∗ 
(0.1777) 
Controls: 
ln Cloud Free Days Y Y Y Y 
ln Population c.2011 × During & Post Y Y Y Y 
Geoclimatic Controls × During & Post Y Y Y Y 
District FE Y Y Y Y 
State-year-month FE Y Y Y Y 
Observations 25625 25625 25625 25625 
R Sqr. 0.9482 0.9497 0.9497 0.9497 
Summary & Notes: This table controls for the effect from differing quarterly changes in deposits 
to show that our base measure–i.e., the change in deposits centered around demonetization–is 
what is driving the findings of Table 2. We also explicitly control for the average growth rate of 
nighttime lights during the pre-period. Standard errors are clustered by district, and statistical 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels is respectively denoted by ***, **, and *. 
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Table 5: Correlation Between Different Treatment Measures 
(n=625) 
Deposit 
Growth 
Rural 
Pop Sh. 
Small Firm 
Share 
Agr. Labor 
Share. 
Deposit Growth 
Rural Pop Share 
Small Firm Share 
1.00 
0.27 
0.21 
1.00 
0.43 1.00 
Agric. Labor Share 0.33 0.79 0.51 1.00 
Summary & Notes: This table provides the correlation between our main measure of exposure 
to demonetization, the growth rate of deposits between Q3 and Q4 of 2016 with other district 
characteristics - the rural population share (2011 Census), the share of agricultural labor in the 
workforce (2011 Census), and the share of non-agricultural workers in firms with less than 10 
workers (6th Economic Census, 2013-14). 
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(a) Agr. Share (b) Non-Ag Small Firm Share (c) Rural Pop. Share 
Figure 8: Agriculture, Rural, and Small Firms District Exposure to Demonetization
Summary & Notes: This figure plots the estimated relationship between the share of the workforce in agriculture (a), non-agricultural
labor force share (b) and a district’s rural population share (c) and the quarterly growth in deposits. As seen, a statistically significant and
positive association with the growth of deposits is only seen during demonetization. As we expect, demonetization is more salient for these
populations, who have greater involvement in informal markets. 
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Table 6: Effect from alternative measures of informality 
Dependent variable: ln of monthly night time lights, Jan. 2014 - May 2018 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A. Agricultural Labor 
IDuring × Share of workforce in agriculture (c.2011) -0.594 
∗∗∗ -0.584 ∗∗∗ -0.299 ∗∗∗ -0.583 ∗∗∗ -0.260 ∗∗∗ 
(0.068) (0.070) (0.071) (0.072) (0.085) 
IP ost× Share of workforce in agriculture (c.2011) 0.516 
∗∗∗ 0.519 ∗∗∗ 0.407 ∗∗∗ 0.523 ∗∗∗ 0.421 ∗∗∗ 
(0.039) (0.038) (0.044) (0.034) (0.045) 
Observations 25625 25625 25625 25625 25625 
R Sqr. 0.942 0.947 0.947 0.948 0.949 
Panel C. Small Firm Share 
IDuring × Share of workforce in small firms (c.2011) -0.485 
∗∗∗ -0.458 ∗∗∗ -0.251 ∗∗ -0.447 ∗∗∗ -0.220 ∗ 
(0.137) (0.144) (0.113) (0.146) (0.115) 
IP ost× Share of workforce in small firms (c.2011) 0.516 
∗∗∗ 0.532 ∗∗∗ 0.430 ∗∗∗ 0.516 ∗∗∗ 0.408 ∗∗∗ 
(0.077) (0.075) (0.072) (0.067) (0.064) 
Observations 25625 25625 25625 25625 25625 
R Sqr. 0.941 0.945 0.947 0.947 0.948 
Panel C. Rural Share 
IDuring × Rural Share (c.2011) -0.523 
∗∗∗ -0.498 ∗∗∗ -0.224 ∗∗∗ -0.478 ∗∗∗ -0.189 ∗∗ 
(0.067) (0.069) (0.070) (0.065) (0.075) 
IP ost× Rural Share (c.2011) 0.507 
∗∗∗ 0.506 ∗∗∗ 0.406 ∗∗∗ 0.484 ∗∗∗ 0.394 ∗∗∗ 
(0.040) (0.038) (0.040) (0.034) (0.040) 
Observations 25625 25625 25625 25625 25625 
R Sqr. 0.942 0.947 0.947 0.948 0.949 
Controls (all panels): 
ln Cloud Free Days N Y Y Y Y 
ln Population c.2011 × During & Post N N Y N Y 
Geoclimatic Controls × During & Post N N N Y Y 
District FE Y Y Y Y Y 
State-year-month FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Summary & Notes: Given the relationship between the share of labor in agriculture and the 
district-level rural share and our primary measure of demonetization intensity in Figure 3, Table 7 
replaces the Q3-Q4 growth in deposits with the agricultural share (Panel A) and the rural share 
(Panel B) and re-estimates our baseline findings of Table 2. Results remain similar to those of 
Table 2. Districts more exposed to demonetization are shown to have an initial decrease that is 
quickly overcome in the following months. Standard errors are clustered by district, and statistical 
signficance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels is respectively denoted by ***, **, and *. 
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Table 7: Demonetization’s Effect on Rural Households 
Dependent variable: ln HH Income ln HH Expenditures 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
IDuring × Rural HH 0.017 0.092 
∗∗ -0.022 ∗∗ -0.011 
(0.019) (0.046) (0.011) (0.026) 
IP ost× Rural HH 0.035 
∗ -0.065 0.014 -0.040 
(0.018) (0.041) (0.010) (0.028) 
IDuring × Dist. Dep. Growth 0.095 0.083 
(0.203) (0.192) 
IP ost× Dist. Dep. Growth -0.324 -0.303 
∗ 
(0.208) (0.178) 
IDuring × Rural HH × Dep. Growth -0.585 
∗ -0.308 
(0.344) (0.210) 
IP ost× Rural HH × Dep. Growth 0.787 
∗∗∗ 0.412 ∗∗ 
(0.292) (0.186) 
Controls 
Household FE Y Y Y Y 
State-year-month FE Y Y Y Y 
Months Prior to Interview FE Y Y Y Y 
Total HH Member FE Y Y Y Y 
Total Earning Member FE Y Y Y Y 
HH Characteristics × During & Post Y Y Y Y 
District Characteristics × During & Post Y Y Y Y 
Marginal Effect, Dep. Growth = 50th percentile: 
IDuring × Rural HH 0.021 -0.021* 
(0.019) (0.011) 
IP ost× Rural HH 0.030* 0.012 
(0.018) (0.010) 
Marginal Effect, Dep. Growth = 90th percentile: 
IDuring × Rural HH -0.024 -0.027 
(0.033) (0.016) 
IP ost× Rural HH 0.090*** 0.039*** 
(0.028) (0.015) 
Observations 4385805 4385805 4385805 4385805 
R Sqr. 0.516 0.516 0.603 0.603 
Summary & Notes: Using a household panel, this table confirms the findings our baseline 
aggregate analysis. Columns (1) and (3) show directly that rural households have relative 
increases in both income and expenditures following demonetization. Columns (2) and (4) explore 
an interaction framework to show that this increase is driven by households in districts that were 
more exposed to demonetization. The household panel is weakly balanced to include only 
households with 12 months of data both pre and post demonetization. Household characteristics 
include the average age of the household, the number of household members under 16 years of age, 
and the mean years of schooling for household members 25 and older. Geoclimatic controls include 
the district-level mean and standard deviation of agricultural suitability, precipitation, 
temperature, malaria suitability, ruggedness, area, coastal land, and indicators for each biome. 
Standard errors are clustered by district, and statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels is 
respectively denoted by ***, **, and *. 
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Table 8: Demonetization’s Effect on Agricultural Households 
Dependent variable: ln HH Income ln HH Expenditures 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
IDuring × Agr. HH -0.008 0.040 -0.016 
∗ 0.017 
(0.021) (0.050) (0.008) (0.022) 
IP ost× Agr. HH 0.119 
∗∗∗ -0.023 0.017 ∗∗ -0.039 
(0.021) (0.044) (0.008) (0.024) 
IDuring × Dist. Dep. Growth 0.014 0.039 
(0.197) (0.179) 
IP ost× Dist. Dep. Growth -0.346 
∗ -0.272 
(0.201) (0.169) 
IDuring × Agr. HH × Dep. Growth -0.370 -0.249 
∗ 
(0.362) (0.151) 
IP ost× Agr. HH × Dep. Growth 1.098 
∗∗∗ 0.436 ∗∗∗ 
(0.315) (0.158) 
Controls 
Household FE Y Y Y Y 
State-year-month FE Y Y Y Y 
Months Prior to Interview FE Y Y Y Y 
Total HH Member FE Y Y Y Y 
Total Earning Member FE Y Y Y Y 
HH Characteristics × During & Post Y Y Y Y 
District Characteristics × During & Post Y Y Y Y 
Marginal Effect, Dep. Growth = 50th percentile: 
IDuring × Agr. HH -0.005 -0.014 
(0.021) (0.008) 
IP ost× Agr. HH 0.110*** 0.014* 
(0.021) (0.008) 
Marginal Effect, Dep. Growth = 90th percentile: 
IDuring × Agr. HH -0.033 -0.024** 
(0.034) (0.012) 
IP ost× Agr. HH 0.194*** 0.043*** 
(0.031) (0.011) 
Observations 4385805 4385805 4385805 4385805 
R Sqr. 0.517 0.517 0.603 0.603 
Summary & Notes: This table replicates Table 8, replacing the indicator for rural households 
with an indicator for the head of the household being an agricultural worker. Agricultural laborers 
are defined as the head of the household reporting either agricultural labor or small farmer as 
his/her primary occupation. Household characteristics include the average age of the household, 
the number of household members under 16 years of age, and the mean years of schooling for 
household members 25 and older. Geoclimatic controls include the district-level mean and 
standard deviation of agricultural suitability, precipitation, temperature, malaria suitability, 
ruggedness, area, coastal land, and indicators for each biome. Standard errors are clustered by 
district, and statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels is respectively denoted by ***, **, 
and *. 
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Table 9: Effect on Private Transfers 
Dependent variable: ln monthly income from private transfers, Jan. 2015-Apr. 2018 
IDuring × HH 
Rural HH 
(1) (2) 
-0.031 ∗∗∗ 0.012 
(0.007) (0.016) 
Agr. HH 
(3) (4) 
-0.029 ∗∗∗ 0.008 
(0.007) (0.019) 
IP ost× HH 0.029 
∗∗∗ 
(0.007) 
-0.034 ∗∗ 
(0.016) 
0.017 ∗∗∗ 
(0.006) 
-0.027 
(0.019) 
IDuring × Dist. Dep. Growth 0.050 
(0.082) 
0.000 
(0.076) 
IP ost× Dist. Dep. Growth -0.218 
∗∗ 
(0.092) 
-0.126 
(0.092) 
IDuring × HH × Dep. Growth -0.335 
∗∗∗ 
(0.116) 
-0.282 ∗∗ 
(0.134) 
IP ost× HH × Dep. Growth 0.501 
∗∗∗ 
(0.113) 
0.341 ∗∗∗ 
(0.127) 
Controls 
Household FE Y Y Y Y 
State-year-month FE 
Months Prior to Interview FE 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Total HH Member FE Y Y Y Y 
Total Earning Member FE 
HH Characteristics × During & Post 
District Characteristics × During & Post 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Marginal Effect, Dep. Growth = 50th percentile: 
IDuring × Agr. HH 
IP ost× Agr. HH 
-0.029*** 
(0.007) 
0.027*** 
(0.007) 
-0.026*** 
(0.007) 
0.014** 
(0.007) 
Marginal Effect, Dep. Growth = 90th percentile: 
IDuring × Agr. HH 
IP ost× Agr. HH 
-0.054*** 
(0.011) 
0.065*** 
(0.010) 
-0.048*** 
(0.011) 
0.040*** 
(0.009) 
Observations 4385805 4385805 4385805 4385805 
R Sqr. 0.560 0.560 0.560 0.560 
Summary & Notes: This table replicates Table 8, replacing the indicator for rural households 
with an indicator for the head of the household being an agricultural worker. Agricultural laborers 
are defined as the head of the household reporting either agricultural labor or small farmer as 
his/her primary occupation. Household characteristics include the average age of the household, 
the number of household members under 16 years of age, and the mean years of schooling for 
household members 25 and older. Geoclimatic controls include the district-level mean and 
standard deviation of agricultural suitability, precipitation, temperature, malaria suitability, 
ruggedness, area, coastal land, and indicators for each biome. Standard errors are clustered by 
district, and statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels is respectively denoted by ***, **, 
and *. 
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Table 10: Credit Post Demonetization 
Dependent variable: ln of quarterly credit, Jan. 2015 - May 2018 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
IDuring × Dep. Growth, 2016q3-2017q1 0.039 0.037 0.021 0.037 0.021 
(0.046) (0.046) (0.048) (0.038) (0.039) 
IP ost× Dep. Growth, 2016q3-2017q1 0.222 
∗∗ 0.222 ∗∗ 0.171 ∗ 0.222 ∗∗ 0.171 ∗ 
(0.105) (0.105) (0.094) (0.101) (0.088) 
Controls: 
ln Cloud Free Days (quarterly avg.) N Y Y Y Y 
ln Population c.2011 × During & Post N N Y N Y 
Geoclimatic Controls × During & Post N N N Y Y 
District FE Y Y Y Y Y 
State-year-quarter FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 8124 8124 8124 8124 8124 
R Sqr. 0.995 0.995 0.995 0.995 0.995 
Summary & Notes: This table estimates the during/post differences in the natural log of 
district level credit with the longer run change in deposits from demonetization. Standard errors 
are clustered by district, and statistical signficance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels is respectively 
denoted by ***, **, and *. 
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Figure 14: Credit by Quarter: Deposit Growth, 2016q3-2017q1 
Summary & Notes: This figure plots the quarterly relationship between the natural log of 
district-level credit and longer run (2016q3-2017q1) deposit growth from demonetization. As 
shown, deposit growth, which serves as a proxy for the intensity of demonetization, has a close to 
zero effect prior to demonetization (2016q4) but a positive effect in the months after 
demonetization. 
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Appendix Tables and Figures 
Table A1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std Deviation Min Max 
ln nighttime lights 25,625 9.426 1.060 0 12.334 
Pre-demonetization 13,750 9.261 1.098 0 12.334 
During-demonetization 1,250 9.239 1.189 4.380 12.257 
Post-demonetization 10,625 9.660 0.944 0 12.327 
District Intensity 
Deposit Growth, 2016q3-2016q4 625 0.139 0.075 -0.246 0.583 
Deposit Growth, 2016q3-2017q1 625 0.142 0.086 -0.110 1.087 
Share of labor in agriculture, 2011 625 0.607 0.185 0.012 0.905 
Share of labor in small firms, 2011 625 0.819 0.118 0.227 0.983 
Share of rural population, 2011 625 0.748 0.191 0 1 
Household Outcomes (in 100s of R) 
Income 4,385,955 133.901 133.874 0 14,981.27 
Expenditures 4,385,955 80.62 55.997 0 10,485.99 
Private Transfers 4,385,955 1.381 11.843 0 1,212.61 
Household Intensity 
Rural 109,284 0.308 0.462 0 1 
Agriculture 109,284 0.201 0.401 0 1 
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Table A2: Base estimation including 2014 
Dependent variable: ln of monthly night time lights, Jan. 2014 - May 2018 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
IDuring × Deposit Growth, 2016q3-2016q4 -0.684 
∗∗∗ -0.686 ∗∗∗ -0.381 ∗∗ -0.722 ∗∗∗ -0.326 ∗ 
(0.212) (0.213) (0.154) (0.207) (0.167) 
IP ost× Deposit Growth, 2016q3-2016q4 0.538 
∗∗∗ 0.596 ∗∗∗ 0.410 ∗∗∗ 0.781 ∗∗∗ 0.543 ∗∗∗ 
(0.137) (0.138) (0.121) (0.118) (0.120) 
Controls: 
ln Cloud Free Days N Y Y Y Y 
ln Population c.2011 × During & Post N N Y N Y 
Geoclimatic Controls × During & Post N N N Y Y 
District FE Y Y Y Y Y 
State-year-month FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 33125 33125 33125 33125 33125 
R Sqr. 0.941 0.945 0.946 0.946 0.947 
Summary & Notes: This table re-estimates the base analysis of Table 2 while extending the 
sample period back one year to 2014. Sets of controls are listed in Table 2. Standard errors are 
clustered by district, and statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels is respectively denoted 
by ***, **, and *. 
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Table A3: Longer Change in Deposits: 2016q3-2017q1 
Dependent variable: ln of monthly night time lights, Jan. 2015 - May 2018 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
IDuring × Deposit Growth, 2016q3-2017q1 -0.544 
∗∗∗ -0.577 ∗∗∗ -0.339 ∗∗ -0.577 ∗∗∗ -0.327 ∗ 
(0.174) (0.176) (0.147) (0.192) (0.168) 
IP ost× Deposit Growth, 2016q3-2017q1 0.320 
∗∗ 0.343 ∗∗∗ 0.217 ∗ 0.376 ∗∗ 0.248 ∗ 
(0.132) (0.128) (0.117) (0.148) (0.134) 
Controls: 
ln Cloud Free Days N Y Y Y Y 
ln Population c.2011 × During & Post N N Y N Y 
Geoclimatic Controls × During & Post N N N Y Y 
District FE Y Y Y Y Y 
State-year-month FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 25625 25625 25625 25625 25625 
R Sqr. 0.941 0.945 0.947 0.947 0.948 
Summary & Notes: This table re-estimates the base analysis of Table 2, replacing the growth in 
deposits between quarters 3 and 4 of 2016 with the longer run growth rate between quarter 3 of 
2016 and quarter 1 of 2017. Sets of controls are listed in Table 2. Standard errors are clustered by 
district, and statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels is respectively denoted by ***, **, 
and *. 
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Table A4: Base estimation using only 2015 lit areas (Intensive margin) 
Dependent variable: ln of monthly night time lights, Jan. 2015 - May 2018 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
IDuring × Deposit Growth, 2016q3-2016q4 -0.148 -0.150 -0.101 -0.104 -0.041 
(0.122) (0.125) (0.122) (0.136) (0.135) 
IP ost× Deposit Growth, 2016q3-2016q4 0.221 
∗ 0.289 ∗∗ 0.213 ∗ 0.402 ∗∗∗ 0.296 ∗∗∗ 
(0.119) (0.119) (0.108) (0.110) (0.107) 
Controls: 
ln Cloud Free Days N Y Y Y Y 
ln Population c.2011 × During & Post N N Y N Y 
Geoclimatic Controls × During & Post N N N Y Y 
District FE Y Y Y Y Y 
State-year-month FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 25625 25625 25625 25625 25625 
R Sqr. 0.973 0.975 0.975 0.976 0.976 
Summary & Notes: This table re-estimates the base analysis of Table 2, replacing the 
unsaturated nighttime lights measure with a measure of nighttime lights that only covers areas 
which were lit in 2015, effectively testing on the intensive margin. Sets of controls are listed in 
Table 2. Standard errors are clustered by district, and statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% 
levels is respectively denoted by ***, **, and *. 
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Table A5: Monthly growth rate of lights 
Dependent variable: monthly growth rate of night time lights, Jan. 2015 - May 2018 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
IDuring× Deposit Growth, 2016q3-2016q4 -0.507 
∗∗∗ -0.509 ∗∗∗ -0.351 ∗∗∗ -0.536 ∗∗∗ -0.325 ∗∗∗ 
(0.111) (0.116) (0.105) (0.111) (0.106) 
IP ost× Deposit Growth, 2016q3-2016q4 0.046 
∗∗ 0.107 ∗∗∗ 0.084 ∗∗∗ 0.114 ∗∗∗ 0.087 ∗∗∗ 
(0.022) (0.025) (0.022) (0.021) (0.020) 
Controls: 
ln Cloud Free Days N Y Y Y Y 
ln Population c.2011 × During & Post N N Y N Y 
Geoclimatic Controls × During & Post N N N Y Y 
District FE Y Y Y Y Y 
State-year-month FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 25625 25625 25625 25625 25625 
R Sqr. 0.529 0.552 0.553 0.553 0.554 
Summary & Notes: This table re-estimates the base analysis of Table 2, replacing the natural 
log of the level of nighttime lights with the month-to-month growth rate of nighttime lights. Sets 
of controls are listed in Table 2. Standard errors are clustered by district, and statistical 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels is respectively denoted by ***, **, and *. 
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Table A6: Growth rate of lights and longer deposit growth 
Dependent variable: monthly growth rate of night time lights, Jan. 2015 - May 2018 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
IDuring × Deposit Growth, 2016q3-2017q1 -0.362 
∗∗∗ -0.395 ∗∗∗ -0.278 ∗∗ -0.393 ∗∗∗ -0.268 ∗∗ 
(0.118) (0.122) (0.116) (0.132) (0.128) 
IP ost× Deposit Growth, 2016q3-2017q1 0.052 
∗∗∗ 0.075 ∗∗∗ 0.057 ∗∗∗ 0.084 ∗∗∗ 0.067 ∗∗∗ 
(0.016) (0.020) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) 
Controls: 
ln Cloud Free Days N Y Y Y Y 
ln Population c.2011 × During & Post N N Y N Y 
Geoclimatic Controls × During & Post N N N Y Y 
District FE Y Y Y Y Y 
State-year-month FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 25625 25625 25625 25625 25625 
R Sqr. 0.529 0.552 0.553 0.553 0.554 
Summary & Notes: This table combines the extensions of Table A5 and Table A3, regressing 
the monthly growth rate of nighttime lights on the longer run growth in deposits interacted with 
during and post demonetization indicators. Sets of controls are listed in Table 2. Standard errors 
are clustered by district, and statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels is respectively 
denoted by ***, **, and *. 
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Table A7: Monthly growth rate of lights along the intensive margin 
(2015 lit areas) 
Dependent variable: monthly growth rate of lights, Jan. 2015 - May 2018 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
IDuring × Deposit Growth, 2016q3-2016q4 -0.096 -0.097 -0.073 -0.116 -0.103 
(0.093) (0.095) (0.092) (0.086) (0.088) 
IP ost× Deposit Growth, 2016q3-2016q4 0.003 0.070 
∗∗∗ 0.064 ∗∗∗ 0.069 ∗∗∗ 0.062 ∗∗∗ 
(0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Controls: 
ln Cloud Free Days N Y Y Y Y 
ln Population c.2011 × During & Post N N Y N Y 
Geoclimatic Controls × During & Post N N N Y Y 
District FE Y Y Y Y Y 
State-year-month FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 25625 25625 25625 25625 25625 
R Sqr. 0.502 0.531 0.531 0.532 0.532 
Summary & Notes: This table combines the extensions of Table A5 and Table A4, replacing our 
primary outcome with the monthly growth rate of lights only in those areas that were already lit 
in 2015, i.e. along an intensive margin. Sets of controls are listed in Table 2. Standard errors are 
clustered by district, and statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels is respectively denoted 
by ***, **, and *. 
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Table A8: Credit Post Demonetization: Other Measures of Exposure 
Dependent variable: ln of quarterly credit, Jan. 2015 - May 2018 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A. Deposit Growth, Q3-Q4 2016 
IDuring × Dep. Growth, 2016q3-2016q4 0.044 0.044 0.022 0.063 0.035 
(0.061) (0.061) (0.059) (0.055) (0.053) 
IP ost× Dep. Growth, 2016q3-2016q4 0.259 
∗ 0.259 ∗ 0.190 0.293 ∗∗ 0.208 ∗ 
(0.149) (0.149) (0.137) (0.139) (0.124) 
Observations 8124 8124 8124 8124 8124 
R Sqr. 0.995 0.995 0.995 0.995 0.995 
Panel B. Agr. Share 
IDuring × Agr. Share of Employment, 2011 0.050 
∗∗ 0.050 ∗∗ 0.032 0.046 ∗∗ 0.027 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.023) (0.024) 
IP ost× Agr. Share of Employment, 2011 0.153 
∗∗ 0.153 ∗∗ 0.095 ∗ 0.178 ∗∗ 0.125 ∗ 
(0.064) (0.064) (0.056) (0.074) (0.064) 
Observations 8124 8124 8124 8124 8124 
R Sqr. 0.995 0.995 0.995 0.995 0.995 
Panel C. Small Share 
IDuring × Share of workforce in small firms (c.2011) 0.025 0.025 0.011 0.014 -0.002 
(0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) 
IP ost× Share of workforce in small firms (c.2011) 0.314 
∗ 0.314 ∗ 0.274 0.368 ∗ 0.330 ∗ 
(0.189) (0.189) (0.181) (0.198) (0.189) 
Observations 8124 8124 8124 8124 8124 
R Sqr. 0.995 0.995 0.995 0.995 0.995 
Panel D. Rural Share 
IDuring × Rural Share of Pop., 2011 0.042 
∗∗ 0.042 ∗∗ 0.024 0.037 ∗ 0.019 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.022) 
IP ost× Rural Share of Pop., 2011 0.110 
∗∗ 0.110 ∗∗ 0.049 0.121 ∗∗ 0.064 
(0.047) (0.047) (0.040) (0.055) (0.045) 
Observations 8124 8124 8124 8124 
R Sqr. 0.995 0.995 0.995 0.995 
Controls: 
ln Cloud Free Days (quarterly avg.) N Y Y Y Y 
ln Population c.2011 × During & Post N N Y N Y 
Geoclimatic Controls × During & Post N N N Y Y 
District FE Y Y Y Y Y 
State-year-quarter FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Summary & Notes: This table re-estimates the findings of Table 10, replacing our regressor of 
interest, deposit growth between 2016q3 and 2017q1 with (Panel A) 2016q3-2016q4 deposit 
growth, (Panel B) the district-level share of agricultural employment, (Panel C) the district-level 
share of those working in small firms (i.e., less than 10 employees), and (Panel D) the district-level 
61 share of the population that is rural. Estimated coefficients generally mirror those of Table 10. 
Standard errors are clustered by district, and statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels is 
respectively denoted by ***, **, and *. 
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(a) Deposit Growth, 2016q3-2016q4 (b) Agr. Share 
Figure A1: Credit by Quarter: Agr. and Rural Share
Summary and Notes: This figure plots the quarter-by-quarter effect (relative to 2016q3) of 2016q3-2016q4 deposit growth in sub-figure
and for district-level agricultural share in sub-figure (b), corresponding to Panels A and B of Table (a) A8. As seen, the effect of each
regressor appears to be increasing over time, suggesting differential trends prior to demonetization. That said, there also appears to be a
discrete jump in the estimated coefficients post-demonetization. 
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(a) Small-firm Share (b) Rural Share 
Figure A2: Credit by Quarter: Agr. and Rural Share
Summary and Notes: This figure plots the quarter-by-quarter effect (relative to 2016q3) of district-level share of employment in
non-agricultural small firms in sub-figure (a) and the district-level rural share of the population in sub-figure (b), corresponding to Panels C
and D of Table A8. As seen, the eff ect of each regressor appears to be increasing over time, suggesting differential trends prior to
demonetization. That said, there also appears to be a discrete jump in the estimated coefficients post-demonetization. 
Table A9: Pre-Demonetization Trends in Credit 
Dependent variable: ln of quarterly credit, 2015q1 - 2016q3 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Trend 0.068 ∗∗ 0.051 ∗ 0.035 0.048 ∗ 0.039 
(0.029) (0.028) (0.027) (0.029) (0.027) 
Trend × Dep. Growth, 2016q3-2017q1 0.017 
(0.011) 
Trend × Dep. Growth, 2016q3-2016q4 0.040 ∗∗ 
(0.017) 
Trend × Agr. Share, c.2011 0.019 ∗∗ 
(0.007) 
Trend × Small Share, c.2011 0.021 ∗∗∗ 
(0.008) 
Trend × Rural Share, c.2011 0.015 ∗∗ 
(0.007) 
Controls: 
Level of deposits, 2016Q3 × Trend Y Y Y Y Y 
Population c.2011 × Trend Y Y Y Y Y 
Geoclimatic Controls × Trendt Y Y Y Y Y 
District FE Y Y Y Y Y 
State × Trend Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 4374 4374 4374 4374 4374 
R Sqr. 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 
Summary & Notes: This table looks at trend differences in credit prior to demonetization from 
our district characteristics associated with a more pronounced effect of demonetization. The 
positive coefficient on the interaction between the trend and the demonetization proxy suggest 
that credit was increasing in these districts prior to demonetization, bringing into question the 
assumption of parallel trends. Standard errors are clustered by district, and statistical significance 
at the 1, 5, and 10% levels is respectively denoted by ***, **, and *. 
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